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After Hegemony? The Varieties of Legal Consciousness Research 
 
Review Article 
 
MARC HERTOGH, NobodyÕs Law: Legal Consciousness and Legal Alienation in Everyday 
Life. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, pp. 215, ISBN 978-1-137-60396-8, £49.99 
(hbk) 
 
Introductioni 
In her 2005 essay ÔAfter Legal ConsciousnessÕ, reviewing the field of legal 
consciousness research, Susan Silbey proposed that Òit might be time to move onÓ 
from its study (Silbey 2005: 323).  The field, she felt, had lost its way and had drifted 
too far from its original underlying purpose.  
This was a striking suggestion, not least because, only seven years previously, 
Silbey had produced one of the most empirically and theoretically rich studies of legal 
consciousness to date (Ewick and Silbey, 1998). Yet, despite SilbeyÕs stature in the 
field,ii and the care with which she made her case, her advice has been roundly 
rejected. An examination of the literature from 2006 onwards reveals that, if anything, 
socio-legal scholarship on legal consciousness has gathered pace.  
The body of work has certainly expanded notably along the dimensions of 
space and time. Legal consciousness research, having previously focused mainly on 
the USA (e.g., Sarat, 1990; Nielsen, 2000; Merry 1990, Engel & Munger, 2003) and 
the UK (e.g., Cooper, 1995; Cowan, 2004), has since been undertaken in a diverse set 
of new countries, including Australia (Richards, 2015), Bolivia (Ellison, 2017), 
Bulgaria (Kurkchiyan, 2011; Hertogh & Kurkchiyan, 2016), Canada (Ranasinghe, 
2010), China (e.g., Gallagher, 2006; Gallagher & Yang, 2011), Egypt (Kulk & de 
Hart, 2013), Malaysia (Moustafa, 2013), Norway (Kurkchiyan, 2011); Poland 
(Kurkchiyan, 2011; Hertogh & Kurkchiyan, 2016), Thailand (Engel & Engel, 2010), 
Uganda, (Sandvick, 2009), and the Ukraine (Kubal, 2015). It has also looked beyond 
the contemporary to include historical enquiry, examining legal consciousness in 
medieval India (Davis & Nemec, 2016) and mid-twentieth century Romania (Serban, 
2014).  
Moreover, researchers are undertaking legal consciousness work in relation to 
an increasingly eclectic set of issues: from abortion (Wilson, 2011), to begging 
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(Ranasinghe, 2010), to cock fighting (Young, 2014), to conservation (Pieraccini and 
Cardwell, 2016), to fat acceptance (Kirkland, 2008), to housing occupation (Cowan et 
al, 2018), to indigeneity (McMillan, 2011), to medicine (Halliday et al, 2014; Picton-
Howell, 2018); to migration (Abrego, 2008 & 2011; Gehring, 2013; Schwenken, 
2013), to ombudsmen (Gill & Creutzfeldt, 2017), to sexualities (Oswald & Kuvalanka, 
2008; Harding, 2011; Knauer, 2012; Hull, 2016), to sex work (Boittin, 2013), to the 
sharing economy (Morgan and Kuch, 2016).  
The socio-legal community is not, it seems, for moving on. Why might this be 
so? How might we explain the enduring appeal of legal consciousness despite the 
latter-day scepticism of perhaps its most influential researcher? 
The answer, it is suggested, is because SilbeyÕs disquiet about legal 
consciousness research having lost its sense of the social and structural character of 
law (on which more later) was based on a history of the research agenda that was 
partial. Her argument only had purchase from the perspective of one particular 
theoretical orientation within socio-legal studies: that of critical legal theory. The 
contention of this essay is that the research agenda and the methodological 
perspectives surrounding legal consciousness have always been more catholic than 
Silbey argued for. The concept, as we shall see, has proved useful for a number of the 
core concerns and traditions of the law & society movement (Engel 1995), unfettered 
to the core project of critical legal theory.  
Most legal consciousness scholars, then, in continuing to employ the concept 
to pursue the basic research questions of the law & society movement, have simply 
overlooked SilbeyÕs scepticism because of its failure to connect with their own 
concerns. Others, however, have explicitly rejected the critical theoretical premise 
underpinning both SilbeyÕs original legal consciousness project and her subsequent 
call to move on. Such is the approach taken by Marc Hertogh in his recent book, the 
subject of this review essay. In rejecting SilbeyÕs critical convictions, Hertogh proposes 
an alternative ÒsecularÓ approach to legal consciousness, one he believes is not 
blinkered by what he sees as critical theoryÕs quasi-religious faith in the hegemonic 
force of the liberal stateÕs legal system. 
We shall critically examine HertoghÕs claims in due course. But first, we must 
substantiate the claim that Silbey has offered only one narrative in a more complex set 
of stories about socio-legal engagement with the notion of legal consciousness. 
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Four Approaches to Legal Consciousness Research  
The argument of this section is that legal consciousness has been a meaningful 
concept for a broad range of socio-legal researchers from the diverse intellectual 
backgrounds that together constitute the law and society field. This suggestion is 
illustrated by identifying at least four broad approaches to socio-legal research for 
which the concept of legal consciousness has been important: (1) a critical approach; 
(2) an interpretive approach; (3) a comparative cultural approach; and (4) a law-in-
action approach.  
A helpful way of sketching out the differences between these approaches is to 
analyse the scholarship according to some basic methodological questions: Why 
should we study legal consciousness? What is meant by legal consciousness? (What is 
the ÔlegalÕ? And what do we mean by ÔconsciousnessÕ?) Whose legal consciousness is 
being explored? How should we study it? By asking these ÔwhyÕ, ÔwhatÕ, ÔwhoÕ and 
ÔhowÕ questions, we can more easily see the catholicity of the legal consciousness 
research agenda, and the particularity of SilbeyÕs account of it. 
Before embarking on the analysis, however, let me offer an important caveat: 
the sketch of these approaches should be interpreted lightly. I am not suggesting, for 
example, that there is no overlap or dialogue between them. Rather, they are 
presented in the manner of Weberian ideal types Ð Òexaggerated or one-sided 
depictions that emphasise particular aspects of what is obviously a richer and more 
complicated realityÓ, as Kronman puts it (1983: 7). The sketch is thus intended merely 
as an analytical device, a way of illustrating diversity within the heritage of the law 
and society field, and, in light of this, of explaining why legal consciousness has proved 
to be such a popular and enduring research concept. Accordingly, I do not suggest 
that all individual projects or researchers can be easily pigeonholed into one of the 
four approaches (though I do make reference to published projects to illustrate 
particular points). 
A CRITICAL APPROACH 
Why study legal consciousness? 
According to Silbey, the principal motivation of a critical focus on legal consciousness 
has been to solve the puzzle of state lawÕs hegemonic force, a puzzle that has emerged 
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from a long line of enquiry regarding law, domination and ideology, one that 
ultimately can be traced back to the work of Marx. As Hunt noted, 
One of the most distinctive derivations from modern Marxism which 
characterizes critical legal theory has been the shift of focus from economic 
relations to the focus upon political and cultural relations. Central to this 
concern is ideology, conceived as a mechanism which forms the consciousness 
of agents. Underlying this preoccupation with ideology is a concern with the 
question: how is it that those who are systematically disadvantaged by the 
existing order nevertheless accept the legitimacy of the institutions and values 
which perpetuate their subordination? (1986: 11) 
For earlier critical legal theorists, legal consciousness was the story which the 
legal profession, particularly the courts, told about law (Hunt, 1986) Ð a story of justice 
and equality under law that failed to match reality but which, in the telling, 
nonetheless caused or permitted society to be largely blind to lawÕs failures and its role 
in the subordination of the working class (Trubek, 1984; Munger and Seron, 1984).  
However, within this critical tradition, legal consciousness operated as a 
theoretical tool, largely in the absence of empirical enquiry. The dynamics of the 
relationship between the story of law promulgated by the legal profession and the legal 
consciousness of ordinary people were under-explored. The mechanisms for the 
faithful reception by society of the false story of law Ð the hegemonic process Ð were 
not fully worked through. SocietyÕs legal consciousness was argued to be either the 
product of a psychological coping mechanism Ð a form of denial prompted by the 
need to deal with the contradictions between rhetoric and reality (Trubek, 1984: 607) 
Ð or it was presumed to be internalised without question by society, a kind of 
Ôtransmission beltÕ model of legal hegemony (Trubek, 1984: 613). Thus the notion of 
law possessing such hegemonic power operated more as a theoretical postulate than as 
an empirical puzzle within critical theory (Trubek, 1984; Sarat and Kearns, 1995). It 
was this empirical hole in the theory of hegemony that law and society scholars, 
including Silbey, identified and responded to through empirical enquiry (Munger and 
Seron, 1984). 
Silbey, with her colleague Ewick (Ewick and Silbey, 1998), has offered the 
most theoretically and empirically rich solution to the puzzle. They proposed a now 
very familiar scheme of three cultural narratives of legality Ð three separate 
characterisations of law in society which are drawn upon and reproduced in a routine 
fashion in our commonplace lives: (1) before the law; (2) with the law; (3) against the 
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law. Rejecting both the notion of hegemony as denial and the Ôtransmission beltÕ 
model of hegemony, they suggested that law draws its hegemonic power from the 
existence of competing and oppositional cultural narratives about lawÕs character. 
Law gains the consent of society as a result of the interplay between two of their three 
common narratives of legality. The fact that these opposing narratives may be 
invoked in different settings and at different times permits legality to maintain its 
position of domination and to retain the faith of its subordinates despite its failures. 
 
The forms of consciousness we call Ôbefore the lawÕ and Ôwith the lawÕ... [w]hile 
ostensibly expressing vastly different and contradictory images of legality, 
together... constitute a hegemonic conception of law. At any moment, the law 
is both a reified transcendent realm, and yet a game... Challenges to legality 
for being only a game, or a gimmick, can be repulsed by invoking legalityÕs 
transcendent reified character. Similarly, dismissals of law for being irrelevant 
to daily life can be answered by invoking its gamelike purposes. Through these 
forms of consciousness (and the opposition between them), legality can be an 
uncontested and unrecognized power that sustains everyday life. (1998: 231) 
 
What is ÔlegalÕ ÔconsciousnessÕ? 
Within a critical approach to the study of legal consciousness, the sense of ÔlegalÕ has 
usually referred to legality in general, as opposed to specific legal provisions or a 
specific set of laws. And despite the fact that the puzzle of hegemony is ultimately 
tethered to state law and the false promise of its institutions, critical legal 
consciousness scholarship is generally pluralistic in terms of what counts as ÔlegalityÕ, 
and so focuses on peopleÕs perceptions of both state law and non-state law (e.g., 
Harding, 2011).iii The focus on perceptions of ÔlawÕ that stand apart from and above 
the state are particularly important, it has been suggested, for the understanding of 
counter-hegemonic struggle (Halliday & Morgan, 2013). 
 The meaning of ÔconsciousnessÕ within the critical approach, however, is less 
straightforward. Indeed, earlier critical legal theory focused more on the unconscious 
than the conscious. As Trubek notes, the goal of such critical theory seemed to match 
Freudian therapeutic ambition in that the aim was to liberate people from false 
consciousness and to bring concealed truths about the realities of law to the surface: 
Like the Freudian analyst, the Critical scholar can bring to ÔconsciousnessÕ 
what is hidden by hegemonic world viewsÉ This approach assumes that social 
actors, like psychoanalytic patients, can be freed of the constraints of delusions 
once the nature of the delusion is identified. (Trubek, 1984; 608, 610) 
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Law and society scholars, however, have generally rejected the notion of false 
consciousness Ð both its implicit framing of people as cultural dupes (Merry, 1995), 
and its connotation of consciousness as being simple and unitary (Sarat, 1990). 
Instead, consistent with a Gramscian conception of consciousness as Òcomplex, 
fragmentary and contradictoryÓ (Hall, 2016: 167), socio-legal scholars have looked for 
and sought to unpack the complexities of legal consciousness in the perceptions and 
actions of humans as knowledgeable agents.  
Nonetheless, the conception of ÔconsciousnessÕ still requires careful 
examination. ÔConsciousnessÕ within a critical approach is more than what people are 
able to actually articulate. Consciousness is revealed not only in what people say, but 
also in what they do (Ewick & Silbey, 1998). Here, a distinction that Anthony Giddens 
draws between ÔdiscursiveÕ and ÔpracticalÕ consciousness is helpful (Giddens, 1984): 
Discursive consciousness connotes those forms of recall which the actors is able 
to express verbally. Practical consciousness involves recall to which the actor 
has access in the dure of action without being able to express what he or she 
thereby ÔknowsÕ. (Giddens, 1984: 49) 
Practical consciousness, then, is a form of tacit or background knowledge connected to 
what people do as purposive agents. 
What agents know about what they do, and why they do it Ð their 
knowledgeability as agents Ð is largely carried in practical consciousness. 
(emphasis in original) (Giddens, 1984: xxiii) 
 
GiddensÕ notion of practical consciousness is a key element of his theory of 
ÔstructurationÕ which seeks to end the Òphoney warÓ (1984: 139) between ÔmacroÕ and 
ÔmicroÕ, structuralist and phenomenological, objectivist and subjectivist sociology. 
Instead, he proposes a middle path, a Ôduality of structureÕ, whereby social structures 
are invoked, and thus reproduced and sustained by agents in managing and making 
sense of everyday life. Accordingly, 
Structure has no existence independent of the knowledge agents have about 
what they do in their day-to-day activity. (Giddens, 1984: 26) 
This middle path between the opposing positions of sociologyÕs Ôphoney warsÕ has 
proved attractive to critical legal consciousness scholars who likewise frame legality as 
having its basis in the routine participation of ordinary people in everyday life, 
through which: 
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actors construct, sustain, reproduce, or amend the circulating É structures of 
meanings concerning law. (Silbey, 2005: 334) 
 
The stress within the critical approach on law as a social structure means that scholars 
have been concerned as much Ð perhaps more so Ð with practical consciousness as 
with discursive consciousness; with what people do in relation to law, as with what 
people are capable of articulating. This has implications for how legal consciousness 
should be researched empirically, as we will discuss further below after a brief 
consideration of whose legal consciousness is the focus on enquiry within the critical 
approach. 
Whose legal consciousness? 
In contrast to earlier critical theoryÕs focus on the legal consciousness of legal officials 
and legal professionals, the attention of the critical law and society scholar usually falls 
upon the legal consciousness of ordinary people. Although Ewick and Silbey (1998) 
studied the legal consciousness of a cross section of the general population, there has 
been a particular interest in other critical studies in the legal consciousness of those 
who are failed by the state legal system. Ultimately, it is the consciousness of the 
Òhave-notsÓ (Galanter, 1974) and the Òsystematically disadvantagedÓ (Hunt, 1986) 
that forms the puzzle of hegemony, or animates collective counter-hegemonic 
struggle. So, legal consciousness scholars working in this tradition have been drawn to 
the working class or the welfare poor (e.g., Sarat, 1984; Merry 1990; Cowan, 2004), 
although other marginalised groups commonly feature too, such as migrants (e.g., 
Abgrego, 2008, 2011), indigenous populations (e.g., Jacobs, 2010) and members of the 
LGBT communities (e.g., Harding 2011; Hull 2016). Likewise, in researching 
counter-hegemonic struggle, the focus has been on social and political activist groups 
(e.g., Fritzvold, 2009; Wilson 2011; Halliday & Morgan, 2013). 
How should it be researched? 
As noted above, law and society scholars have generally been sceptical of simple 
answers to the puzzle of legal hegemony and a simple model of consciousness. 
Consequently, work which draws on this tradition usually looks for more complex and 
contradictory phenomena, relying on intensive qualitative research methods to obtain 
rich and nuanced data about peopleÕs perceptions and ideas about law. Moreover, 
given the critical interest in peopleÕs Ôpractical consciousnessÕ of legality Ð the 
sustenance and reproduction of legality as a social structure Ð researchers in this 
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tradition sometimes avoid the direct questioning about law in their research 
interviews. Rather than artificially introduce law into the research conversation, the 
preferred method is to wait and see how background ideas about law emerge naturally 
and structure discussions about everyday life (e.g, Ewick & Silbey, 1998: 26). 
 
AN INTERPRETIVE APPROACH 
Why should we study legal consciousness? 
The second approach to legal consciousness falls within an interpretive tradition of the 
social sciences. The methodological orientation that unites such work across the 
disciplines of sociology, anthropology, law, and political science, ultimately derives 
from the emphasis Max Weber placed on seeking Òan interpretive understanding of 
social action É insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to his 
behaviourÓ (Weber, 1987: 4).  
An interpretive orientation can be applied to questions emerging from critical 
legal theory, of course, as we saw above. However, what separates the interpretive 
from the critical approach within this ideal typology is that, unlike the critical 
approach, the interpretive approach is not centrally concerned with domination and 
the social structures that, although reproduced and sustained in peopleÕs routine 
action, have, in one sense, an existence beyond those people. Rather, at its most basic 
level, interpretive research is motivated by the simple desire to understand how 
ordinary peopleÕs behaviour responds to their subjective perceptions of law. Thus, 
research is generally focused on the individuals who are the subjects of the research: 
how do these particular individuals perceive law, and what significance do those 
perceptions have for their behaviour?  
The research agenda of the interpretive approach is an open one and has been 
applied to an eclectic set of sub-topics. Nonetheless, we can observe in it a major 
preoccupation of the law and society movement: the significance of legal 
consciousness for disputing behaviour (or its lack) in relation to problematic events. 
Typical research questions would concern whether, how, and why people ÔmobiliseÕ 
the law (or fail to) in relation to problems they face in everyday life (e.g., Erie, 2012; 
Schwenken 2013; Ellison, 2017). 
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What is ÔlegalÕ ÔconsciousnessÕ? 
Consistent with the open research agenda of this tradition, the ÔlegalÕ in legal 
consciousness is interpreted broadly. At times, it refers to legality in general (e.g., 
Hernandez 2010; Ranasinghe, 2010); at other times the research focus is on how oneÕs 
research subjects interpret particular aspects of state law, such as in relation to 
criminal justice (Farmer et al, 2015), discrimination (Hirsh & Lyons, 2010), privacy 
(Lageson, 2017), or property (Cowan et al, 2018). However, given the methodological 
commitment to researching the meaning of social action from the perspective of oneÕs 
particular research subjects, there is often a corresponding desire to honour those 
research subjectsÕ conceptions of ÔlawÕ and their potential to range well beyond formal 
state law.iv Accordingly, this commonly involves the embrace of legal pluralism as part 
of the research agenda. 
 As regards the meaning of ÔconsciousnessÕ within the interpretive approach, 
the stress is on discursive consciousness and its significance for social action. In this 
way, research focuses both on what research subjects say about law, as well as what 
they do. But the methodological significance of this must be contrasted with the 
critical approach. As we saw above, within a critical approach the focus on what 
people do in relation to law is important for revealing their practical consciousness Ð 
what they cannot say Ð and, thereby, the character of legality as a social structure. 
However, within the interpretive approach it is what people can say that reveals the 
subjective meaning that they attach to what they do. ÔDoingÕ Ð social action Ð is the 
ultimate research concern; ÔsayingÕ Ð discursive consciousness Ð is the window onto 
the subjective meaning of that social action.  
Whose legal consciousness? 
Like the critical approach, research within the interpretive tradition is concerned with 
the legal consciousness of lay people and not legal professionals.v However, by way of 
contrast with the critical approach, it is not generally pre-occupied with the working 
class, or the welfare poor, or other disadvantaged groups. Instead, research in the 
interpretive tradition might focus on actors that we would not necessarily associate 
with being dominated or disadvantaged, such as, for example, college students 
(Farmer et al, 2015) or courtroom participants (Ng, 2009). Indeed, some studies set 
out to focus on the legal consciousness of powerful actors in specific social settings, 
such as business owners in relation to the regulation of public space (Ranasinghe 
2010) or tax lawyers (Cornut-St Pierre, 2019). 
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How should we research it? 
The interest in the subjective meaning attached to social action usually leads 
researchers towards qualitative research methods, most often qualitative interviews 
(e.g., Hernandez, 2010; Schwenken 2013), though observational and participatory 
approaches can be particularly revealing (e.g., Gallagher, 2006; Erie, 2012).  
 
A COMPARATIVE CULTURAL APPROACH 
Why	should	we	study	legal	consciousness?	
The third tradition of socio-legal research revolves around the idea of legal culture 
and employs the method of comparison in order to gain a better understanding of it. 
The analytical promise of comparison is that the observation of difference can de-
familiarise and reveal the contingency of various taken-for-granted aspects of a 
particular legal culture. Legal consciousness has thus come to operate as a key aspect 
of the enquiry (Hertogh and Kurkchiyan, 2016), one that captures the core research 
interest in cultural beliefs and ideas around law. 
What	is	‘legal’	‘consciousness’?	
The ÔlegalÕ within this tradition of legal consciousness research usually refers to legality 
in general, rather than to particular legal rules or provisions. So, for example, the 
topic of interest might be peopleÕs attitudes towards courts or the legal system 
(Fukurai, 2007), peopleÕs perceptions of lawÕs role in maintaining social order 
(Kurkchiyan, 2011), or peopleÕs willingness to use the legal system to solve their 
problems (Shinohara and Uggen, 2009). Although the enquiry often focuses on 
attitudes towards the formal state legal system, it can also relate simply to peopleÕs 
cognitive images of law, and thus embrace a sense of legal pluralism (Hertogh & 
Kurkchiyan, 2016). 
The conception of ÔconsciousnessÕ draws on a Durkheimian tradition of 
framing culture as a social fact. Indeed, the notion of a Ôcollective legal consciousnessÕ, 
thus connecting to DurkheimÕs concept of the conscience collective, has been suggested in 
order to capture this sense of a set of beliefs and attitudes that exists positively, above 
and beyond the individual. As Kurkchiyan puts it:  
 
societies construct a sense of social order that is specific to them. As a 
necessary part of that broad process, they develop a collective legal 
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consciousness. That consciousness provides them with distinct interpretations 
of the meanings, the content, and the roles of law in the lives of the people 
(2011: 390).  
Whose	legal	consciousness?	
As the quotation from Kurkchiyan above suggests, the unit of analysis within this 
tradition of legal consciousness research is often the society, usually delimited by 
national jurisdictional boundaries, although key groups of societal members, such as, 
for example, jurors (Fukurai, 2007), may be isolated for analytical purposes. 
Ultimately, in such research, it is societies as a whole, and their characteristic 
consciousness around law that are being compared with others.  
Increasingly, however, the comparative exercise is also being conducted at a 
sub-societal level, examining cultural groups within jurisdictional boundaries. Here, 
the focus may be on the significance of ethnicity, gender or religious identity to the 
formation of meanings around law and legality (e.g., Blackstone et al, 2009; Hirsh & 
Lyons, 2010; Moustafa, 2013). 
How	should	we	study	it?	
The common method of enquiry within this approach to legal consciousness research 
is the large ÔnÕ survey, given its capacity to elicit, through the discursive responses of 
the sample respondents, an image of the collective perceptions of, and attitudes 
towards law within a given society or cultural group.  
 
A LAW IN ACTION APPROACH 
Whereas the first three approaches to legal consciousness research emerged from the 
social sciences and can be linked Ð in some ways at least Ð to the classical sociological 
theorists, the fourth approach is more of a Law School enterprise, one that owes its 
energy to PoundÕs original distinction between law in books and law in action (Pound, 
1910). 
Why should we study legal consciousness? 
The impetus to study legal consciousness here comes from the desire to understand 
the social reality of law Ð law as it is implemented, as opposed to law as it was written. 
The legal consciousness of those charged with implementation can matter for lawÕs 
translation from books to action. 
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 Legal scholars have long been interested in the empirical realities of the 
implementation of law. Some of this work, often known as Ôgap studiesÕ, has been 
policy focused, driven by a concern to narrow the gap between law in books and law 
in action (Bankowski and Nelken, 1981; Gould and Barclay, 2012). Other work has 
been less concerned with reform, and driven more by a curiosity about the factors that 
influence legal implementation (Kagan, 1995), or with the ambition of portraying the 
limited reach of formal legality (e.g., Halliday, 2004). 
 Legal consciousness has recently come to be regarded as offering something to 
this research agenda in light of the conviction that the legal consciousness of those 
who implement the law in books is likely to be significant to the law that is delivered 
on the ground. 
What is ÔlegalÕ ÔconsciousnessÕ? 
The ÔlegalÕ in legal consciousness here, rather than denoting legality in general, most 
often refers to specific provisions or aspects of positive state law. The enquiry usually 
revolves around the implementation of a particular legal scheme. 
 As regards ÔconsciousnessÕ, we can make a link back here to the interpretive 
approach. In similar fashion, the enquiry focuses on discursive consciousness and the 
subjective meanings attached to law in the implementation process. In part, this can 
relate to legal knowledge and particular legal interpretations adopted in the course of 
implementation work. However, more often the research enquiry is concerned with 
individualsÕ attitudes and orientations towards the law, and the significance of legal 
knowledge and values to implementation. 
Whose legal consciousness? 
As mentioned above, it is the legal consciousness of key actors in the implementation 
process that is of interest within this approach. Often, such actors are public 
functionaries, such as tribunal members (Richardson, 2015), public health officials 
(Jacobs, 2007), or public hospital doctors (Picton-Howell, 2018), with responsibility for 
implementing a legal scheme, or for delivering public services within key legal 
parameters. However, actors in the private sector, such as workplace supervisors 
(Munkres, 2008), can be equally significant to aspects of law in action, such as 
discrimination law. 
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How should we study legal consciousness? 
In theory at least, the research methods capable of application to the study of legal 
consciousness within this approach are as broad as the social sciences themselves. In 
practice, however Ð thus far, at least Ð qualitative methods, particularly the qualitative 
interview, have been used. 
 
TABLE 1: Summary of the varieties of legal consciousness research 
 Why? What? Who? How? 
Critical Hegemony, 
counter-hegemony, 
structuration 
Legality in general Disadvantaged 
and marginalised; 
activists 
Qualitative methods 
Practical and 
discursive 
consciousness 
Interpretive Meaningful social 
action 
Legality in general; 
specific legal 
provisions 
Anyone Qualitative methods 
Discursive 
consciousness 
Comparative 
Cultural 
Legal cultural 
comparison 
Legality in general Whole societies / 
cultural groups 
Quantitative surveys 
Collective 
consciousness 
Law-in-Action Legal 
implementation 
Specific legal 
provisions 
Key 
implementation 
actors 
Qualitative methods 
(so far) 
Discursive 
consciousness 
 
After Hegemony? 
The section above suggested that SilbeyÕs call to move on has gone unheeded because 
legal consciousness has wide appeal as a concept across a range of approaches to law 
and society research, summarised in Table 1 above. Whilst precise conceptions of 
legal consciousness might differ according to those approaches, the concept itself has 
proven itself capable of wide application, attractive to many for its sense of offering 
something fundamental and significant to the study of law in society.  
Marc Hertogh in his recent book, however, rather than simply overlooking 
SilbeyÕs exhortations, addresses himself directly to the underlying premise of her 
critical approach, questioning the hegemonic power of state law.  
There is an interesting and attractive parallel between the starting point of 
HertoghÕs research agenda and that of the critical law and society scholars who first 
turned their attention to the topic of legal consciousness forty or so years ago. Just as 
those scholars spotted an empirical hole in the critical theory of hegemony, so 
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Hertogh asserts that there is an empirical hole in the critical theory of legal 
consciousness. In essence, HertoghÕs critique begins with the plea, Ôshow me the data!Õ 
 
Critical legal consciousness studies are based on the idea [that] the law still 
Ôretains support among the peopleÕ, despite a persistent gap between the law in 
the books and the law in action. However, this picture is imbalanced and 
inaccurate. (p. 9) 
 
É these studies put more emphasis on how rather than if law dominates 
everyday life É [S]alience of the law is presumed rather than problematized. 
(Emphasis in original, p. 11) 
 
Accordingly, Hertogh treats the hegemonic power of state law as an empirical 
question rather than a puzzle. His answer to that question begins with a striking 
account drawn from the Dutch news media Ð ÔErikÕs Day in CourtÕ (pp. 1- 6) Ð about 
a fatherÕs reaction to the sentencing of the car driver who had killed his child through 
reckless driving. Erik was present in court to hear the judge hand down a sentence of 
just 120 hours of community service. He erupted in anger, threw his chair at the 
judge, and had to be forcibly removed by security guards. 
This story is used to symbolize, in a particularly arresting way, the core 
empirical claim of the book, which Hertogh sets out with the aid of a wide range of 
data: surveys, qualitative interviews, parliamentary inquiry data, and a secondary 
analysis of a policy evaluation study. His claim is that, far from putting their faith in 
state law, ordinary members of society increasingly feel alienated from it; rather than 
turning towards state law in blind faith, people are actually turning away from it: 
These findings challenge the idea that people Ð despite strong criticism Ð still 
turn to law. Instead, the case studies and survey evidence in this book suggest 
that Ð because of this criticism Ð people move away from lawÉ For most 
people É the law is not Ôall overÕ and law is not ÔinfusedÕ into their everyday 
lifeÉ [S]tate law has become nobodyÕs law. (pp. 178-9) 
In light of this, Hertogh calls for a re-orientation of legal consciousness 
research. His book offers a roadmap for the researcher: legal alienation, he argues, as 
the characteristic legal consciousness of contemporary society, should be the core 
focus of our future research endeavours.  
This is a powerful claim, one that merits a considered response. What should 
we make of it? The suggestion of this essay is that HertoghÕs focus on legal alienation 
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is both welcome and important. It is trite to observe that we live in a time of 
significant antipathy towards government. The widespread rise of populism (Canovan, 
1999; Lacey, 2019), contemporary sustained public protests such as the gilets jaunes in 
France, the election (in the USA and the Ukraine, for example) of political outsiders 
and newcomers, even the Brexit vote in the UK (Clarke and Newman, 2017), all 
suggest a growing disaffection with the traditional expertise and authority that are 
associated with governmental institutions. A sense of disconnection to law and the 
legal system must surely form part of this wider picture. So, HertoghÕs advocacy for 
greater socio-legal engagement with, and examination of, legal alienation is timely 
and significant. 
However, at the same time, his overall thesis is not without its vulnerabilities. 
There are two key issues to focus on here. Neither of these issues takes away from the 
importance of HertoghÕs focus on legal alienation, but both are significant for our 
wider understanding of legal consciousness. 
Hegemony	and	Counter-Hegemony	
The first objection to HertoghÕs thesis is methodological. Although his book usefully 
concludes that the field should focus its attention on legal alienation, the method of 
analysis that carries him to this conclusion is problematic, it is suggested. In short, the 
argument here is that Hertogh does not succeed in countering the core claim of the 
critical legal consciousness work, exemplified by Silbey, about the hegemonic power of 
state law. 
HertoghÕs legal alienation thesis is an empirical claim Ð and a very striking one 
at that. Yet it is open to methodological challenge. At a surface level, we might 
challenge him about how he interprets his data, questioning the consistency of the 
empirical picture he paints. For example, while in chapter 2 he interprets general 
public opinion survey data about the justice system to suggest that its legitimacy is 
contested, in chapter 8, as part of an argument about the impact of legal alienation, 
he presents survey data from traffic law offenders indicating that significant majorities 
think that one should obey the law even where one doesnÕt think it is right, and that 
disobeying the law is seldom justified.  
Or we might query the extent to which his analysis takes account of the 
complexity and internal contradictions of individualsÕ legal consciousness. We know 
from qualitative research that individuals evoke contradictory images of law at 
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different points, sometimes even within the same sentence (Ewick & Silbey, 1998: 50-
51). So, even if Hertogh can persuade us that his research subjects, in a particular 
moment, feel alienated from a particular aspect of state law, or from particular 
features of the justice system, how confident should we be about their general legal 
consciousness? 
Or we might probe the detail of some of his analysis. His case study of cartels 
in the construction industry, for example, concerns a body of competition law with its 
source in the European Union. All of us in the EU live in a region of both domestic 
and supra-national regional legality. To what extent should we interpret disquiet with 
EU-originated law as alienation from domestic state legality? 
However, the deeper methodological challenge for HertoghÕs analysis is that it 
overreaches with the data. It makes too big a claim, in other words.  There is a less 
and a more important point here. The less important point is that, although Hertogh 
marshals an impressive array of studies for his project, they all emanate from the 
Netherlands and most of them focus on particular aspects of state law Ð discrimination 
law, competition law, public law and road traffic law Ð rather than state law generally. 
But, this is not really the heart of the problem of overreach. The difficulty is not that 
Hertogh needs more data, but rather that Ð somewhat counter-intuitively Ð he needs 
to look up from his data to see what is apparent without the need for any particular 
dataset: neither the Netherlands, nor any other liberal society, are places where state 
law is nobodyÕs law.  
Perhaps the easiest way to make this point is to conduct a simple thought 
experiment: what would a society that is truly alienated from state law Ð where most 
people have turned their backs on it Ð actually look like? It would be a society that is 
governed through open and widespread repression, rather than largely through 
consent. It would be a totalitarian or authoritarian state, rather than a liberal one, 
where, as Krygier puts it when describing life under communism, 
Law is one of an array of instruments for translating the governmentÕs É 
wishes into action and maintaining social order. It will last as long and change 
as fast as the rulers wish, be as vague as is useful, be enforced as capriciously as 
the central authorities or their servants consider appropriate. (1990: 641) 
If state law is nobodyÕs law, ordinary people expect little of it Ð consistently and 
generally Ð except arbitrary and oppressive enforcement. The likes of Erik do not 
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erupt in anger. It is only people for whom state law is still fundamentally theirs that 
express such outrage, indignation and disappointment. 
The better way of interpreting HertoghÕs datasets, it is suggested, is to 
recognise that a degree of legal alienation is consistent with the general legitimacy of 
state law and the general assent of the people to the legal regime. The existence of 
legal alienation does not, in itself, challenge a claim about the hegemonic power of 
state law. As was noted above, a major premise of critical legal consciousness work is 
that consciousness is multifaceted and fragmented. Both society and individuals are 
complex, so we should not expect ideas and currents of thought to be uniform or 
unidirectional. As Stuart Hall has noted: 
Hegemony is not ideological mystification. Nor is it cultural domination as 
total incorporation, as if all the contradictory and oppositional forces and 
practices simply were engulfed and disappearÉ (2016: 169) 
Any theory of hegemony, then, must look for and take account of counter-
hegemony. Indeed, such is part of Ewick and SilbeyÕs theory of legal consciousness, an 
aspect that they discussed in interview:   
We came by the other story Ð Ôagainst the lawÕ Ð by seeing the relationship 
between [it and the other two]. They just play off each other. And then we 
realized that the first two were the hegemonic... And the other [Ôagainst the 
lawÕ] is about counter-hegemony. (Ewick & Silbey 2009: 225) 
HertoghÕs theory of legal alienation, accordingly, rather than being a 
refutation of legal hegemony, is better regarded an exploration of counter-hegemony. 
HertoghÕs work, particularly his analysis of legal alienation along the dimensions of 
ÔawarenessÕ and ÔidentificationÕ (chapter 3) is very helpful in this regard and should be 
placed alongside others who have argued that greater depth and nuance can be 
offered to Ewick and SilbeyÕs Ôagainst the lawÕ narrative and its depiction of counter-
hegemony. Harding (2011), for example, drawing on the work of Foucault, 
interrogates the notion of resistance and suggests three different forms: ÔstabilisingÕ, 
ÔmoderatingÕ and ÔfracturingÕ resistance. Likewise, Halliday and Morgan (2013), 
drawing on the work of Mary Douglas, have argued that Ewick and Silbey have 
focused too heavily on individual acts of resistance, suggesting that greater attention 
can be paid to practices of counter-hegemony that are rooted in a sense of collective 
agency, and which involve a collective effort to alter the power structures in society.  
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We do not need to defeat the claim about state lawÕs hegemonic force in order 
to turn our attention towards counter-hegemony. Hegemony and counter-hegemony, 
acquiescence and resistance, identification and alienation, co-exist in a permanent 
state of tension. In short, although Hertogh is absolutely right to suggest that there is 
much more to legal consciousness than the puzzle of hegemony, he is wrong to suggest 
that state law does not have hegemonic force. So, we should simply bracket off that 
negative part of HertoghÕs thesis and focus instead on his positive contribution Ð his 
exploration of legal alienation. 
Legal	Consciousness	as	a	Protean	Concept	
There is much to admire in HertoghÕs book, not least his intellectual ambition. Like 
Silbey, Hertogh asks a big question and offers an answer that is intended to orient the 
legal consciousness field. Whereas SilbeyÕs suggestion was to abandon ship, Hertogh 
urges us to change direction. 
 There is absolutely nothing wrong in trying to orient a field of research. 
Indeed, such work can be incredibly helpful and is, of course, the bread and butter of 
much modern scholarship, particularly when one has reached a certain seniority, 
having spent a great deal of time researching, reading and writing in that field. The 
difficulty, however, both for Hertogh and Silbey before him, is that legal 
consciousness is not really a field. As this essay has tried to show, it is better to think of 
it not as a field of research, but as a concept that has been applied widely across an 
eclectic range of subjects, drawing on diverse theoretical traditions, shedding light on 
many of the core interests of law and society scholars.  
The adaptability of legal consciousness as a concept, as was argued above, has 
ensured its continuing Ð perhaps even growing Ð appeal to socio-legal researchers. 
But, moreover, it is this protean quality that prevents legal consciousness research 
from properly coalescing into a coherent field of enquiry. Thus, just as SilbeyÕs call to 
move on went unheeded, so any call for legal consciousness research to move in a 
particular direction is bound to miss its mark to some extent. For sure, the call will 
resonate and have relevance for some, but for many it will fail to connect with the 
nature of their research endeavours. 
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Conclusion 
Marc Hertogh urges us to divert our attention away from legal hegemony towards 
legal alienation. This is problematic in two ways. First, even though the puzzle of 
hegemony may not be as puzzling as it once was, there is more work to be done on 
phenomenon of legal hegemony itself, it is suggested. Significantly, for example, not 
much progress has been made since Ewick and SilbeyÕs seminal work (Ewick and 
Silbey,1998) in our understanding of the mechanics of structuration as regards the 
power of state law in society. In essence, Ewick and Silbey argued that storytelling is 
the answer to that question. By routinely telling two alternative but positive stories of 
law (Ôwith the lawÕ; Ôbefore the lawÕ), we maintain the power of law, they suggested. 
But there must be more to this than storytelling. What other forms of social action 
might also contribute in some way to the reproduction of lawÕs structural power Ð 
particularly social action by those who, to some extent at least, recognise the 
disadvantaging and oppressive capacity of law? The existing literature offers some 
examples: Halliday & Morgan (2013) examine the withdrawal of activists from 
counter-hegemonic struggle, stressing the ubiquity of state law and its reach into 
individual lives; Cowan (2004) focuses on the use of legal redress mechanisms by those 
who are most disadvantaged by state law, showing how state law, somewhat 
paradoxically, can be chosen to resist the oppressions of state law (see also Lazarus 
Black & Hirsch, 1994). Such studies offer some examples of social action Ð connected 
to, but separate from storytelling Ð that contribute to the reproduction of lawÕs 
structural power.vi But there will be more, and the exploration of such could be a 
fruitful aspect of continued legal consciousness research. 
 Second, however, HertoghÕs exhortation that we should turn away from legal 
hegemony misfires by virtue of the fact that to do so is unnecessary in order to achieve 
his main goal: the focus on legal alienation. The legal alienation thesis presents itself as 
a counter to the legal hegemony thesis. However, the better way to interpret 
HertoghÕs book may be to focus more on its points of connection to the critical 
tradition that he rejects than on any theoretical divergence. What unites HertoghÕs 
work with that of the critical scholars is that they all, to some extent at least, are 
concerned with state lawÕs failures, disappointments and oppressions; the extent to 
which, and the ways in which, people feel this; and what people think and do in light 
of that. This is an important and very fertile line of enquiry for socio-legal scholars, 
particularly in the current era.  
 20 
 But the final point of this essay is that, although Hertogh makes an important 
contribution to legal consciousness research and offers a really helpful set of ideas for 
taking the research forward, his legal alienation thesis can only ever be one aspect of a 
more complex and disorganised body of work in which legal consciousness appears as 
a useful and malleable concept. This book certainly deserves to be read widely but, by 
virtue of the kaleidoscopic nature of the body of work to which it contributes, its 
ultimate appeal may not match the quality of its scholarship. 
 
SIMON HALLIDAY 
University of York, UK 
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i The ideas in this review essay were first presented at a workshop in the Department of Legal and 
Social Science at the University of Chieti-Pescara. I am very grateful to my hosts, Prof. Stefano 
Civitarese and Prof. Francesco Bilancia, for their invitation and for their insightful feedback on the 
paper. Additional support and feedback was received from TT Arvind, Dave Cowan and Bronwen 
Morgan Ð my thanks to them too. 
ii According to Google Scholar, by the Spring of 2019 Ewick & Silbey (1998) had attracted more than 
1750 citations. 
iii In this way, I would respectfully disagree with HertoghÕs suggestion (2004) that we might identify an 
ÔAmericanÕ and ÔEuropeanÕ model of legal consciousness, with the American model being distinguished 
on the basis of its non-legally-plural focus on state law. 
iv At this point, legal consciousness research might depart from WeberÕs sociology of law. Although 
WeberÕs concept of law ranged well beyond state law, it was nonetheless tied to a system of rules 
enforced by specialist personnel (see, e.g., Weber, 1978, 317). 
v There has been a recent counter-intuitive suggestion that we might usefully move beyond the study of 
human actors to explore the legal consciousness of physical objects, inspired by some of the insights of 
Actor Network Theory (Cowan et al, 2018). On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that the 
argument being made is that physical objects can be imbued with, and come to represent or symbolize, 
the legal consciousness of human actors. Ultimately, then, humans remain the focus of enquiry. 
vi For an excellent example of such an enquiry in relation to education and post-educational work 
choices, see Willis (1978). 
